Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals under TRIPS: What Standard of Compensation by Vaughan, Susan Vastano
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 25
Number 1 Fall 2001 Article 4
1-1-2001
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals under
TRIPS: What Standard of Compensation
Susan Vastano Vaughan
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Susan Vastano Vaughan, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals under TRIPS: What Standard of Compensation, 25 Hastings Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 87 (2001).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol25/iss1/4
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals
Under TRIPS: What Standard of
Compensation?
BY SUSAN VASTANO VAUGHAN*
Introduction
Harmonization of international intellectual property laws has
been the object of considerable recent effort under both public
international law1 and international trade law. The GATT Uruguay
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M.S., Marine and Atmospheric Chemistry, University of Miami; B.S., Chemical
Engineering, Texas A&M University. The author wishes to thank Gregory Vaughan,
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1. Laurinda L. Hicks & James Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual
Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y
769, 781 (1997). The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a
specialized United Nations agency, has conducted extensive negotiations on
harmonizing international intellectual property laws. WIPO administers the Paris
Convention, which requires national treatment but does not provide for minimum
levels of protection for IPR. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as revised at Stockholm,
July 14, 1967, and as amended on Oct. 2, 1979) [hereinafter Paris Convention].
WIPO seeks to promote protection of IPR through international cooperation. As
discussed further in Section II, WIPO efforts to date at substantive harmonization of
international intellectual property laws have been largely unsuccessful.
2. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 1, at 783-84. The results of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, included the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, 83-111 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS]. GAT established the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was the
administrative agency for TRIPS. WTO Agreement, supra, 33 I.L.M. at 1144-52.
TRIPS required minimum standards for both procedural and substantive aspects of
intellectual property protection, and provided enforcement mechanisms under a
Dispute Settlement Body. Importantly, as discussed further in Section II, TRIPS
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Round Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS) resulted in significant steps toward harmonization
However, most of the harmonization efforts implemented to date
have focused on procedural matters, such as international patent
application procedures, and the duration of patents.
Upcoming harmonization efforts will turn to substantive issues,
and will likely present an even greater challenge than did procedural
harmonization An area of significant early debate has been the
proper application of compulsory licensing of patents under TRIPS.6
Although TRIPS does not expressly provide for it, Article 31 of
TRIPS effectively allows compulsory licensing, provided the patent
holder is compensated by "adequate remuneration."7  Proposed
standards of compensation have been wildly divergent, reflecting the
conflicting policy concerns of developed and developing nations.'
This policy struggle is most vividly exemplified where critical
pharmaceuticals, developed and patented through vast investments of
time and resources, are unattainable in developing countries due to
linked trade benefits under GATT to compliance with harmonized standards for
protection of intellectual property rights.
3. TRIPS, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (bringing United States procedures for patent filing,
publication, and duration closer to the world model).
5. See generally Owen Lippert, One Trip to the Dentist is Enough: Reasons to
Strengthen Intellectual Property Rights Through the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 241, 275-76 (1998); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round:
Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 282 (1997).
6. Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry
Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO
Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
1069, 1114 (1996); Lippert, supra note 5, at 275-76 (arguing for heightened protection
of intellectual property to promote economic efficiency and innovation).
7. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(h).
8. Weissman, supra note 6, at 1114 (arguing that "adequate remuneration"
should be based on the value to the grantee of the compulsory license, likely to be at
a level significantly less than the grantor's valuation); Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for
Developing Countries Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735,
755 (1996) (arguing that the need to make pharmaceuticals available to the
population of a developing country at an affordable rate should constitute a valid
ground for invoking an exception under TRIPS); Lippert, supra note 5, at 295
(arguing for protection of IPR as investment property protected by expropriation
law). The term "developing nations" will be used to encompass both developing and
least developed nations as these countries share many of the same needs and
concerns with respect to intellectual property protection.
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their high cost.9 Such cases present a compelling rationale for
compulsory licenses with minimal compensation." The debate,
however, continues to rage." Do critical human health needs in
developing countries outweigh the pharmaceutical companies' right
to a fair profit? 2 Does the burden of meeting developing countries'
critical health care needs properly fall on private companies? Does
humankind's long-term need to develop cures require that we foster
innovation, accepting the cost of ignoring developing countries'
immediate health needs? 3  What solution best addresses these
competing concerns? 4
This Note reviews the compulsory license compensation
standards that have been proposed in partial answer to this debate,
correlating them with the policy concerns the standards seek to
address. Section I describes the nature and status of intellectual
property rights (IPR) and the conflict between developed and
developing nations as to their proper reach. Section II provides a
brief discussion of the evolution of international intellectual property
regulations, with a focus on patents. Section III defines compulsory
licensing of patents, describes international regulation of compulsory
licenses under TRIPS, and summarizes current national compulsory
licensing statutes and compliance with TRIPS. Section IV discusses
some proposed standards of compensation for compulsory licenses as
a function of the policy concerns the standards seek to address.
Finally, Section V concludes with recommendations as to the
appropriate approach to defining the standard of compensation for
compulsory licensing of patents under TRIPS.
9. Duane Nash, South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act of 1997,15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 485,486 (2000).
10. Id.
11. Tom Abate, Drugmakers Yield to Pressure, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 25, 2001, at
A15.
12. Nash, supra note 9, at 502; see also Frederick M. Abbott, Discontinuities in the
Intellectual Property Regime: The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address
Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 71, 72 (2001) (stating that
concerns about protecting the long-term benefits of IPR cannot outweigh the
imminent health crises faced by developing nations).
13. Nash, supra note 9, at 501-02.
14. Gana, supra note 8, at 772.
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1. International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights:
Traditional Sovereign Roles and Conflicting Interests
Intellectual property rights (IPR) are rights that convey a limited
monopoly in a new application of art or science, particularly in a
commercially useful manner. IPR are granted by statute and take the
form of patents,15 copyrights,16 and trademarks. 7 IPR serve the dual
purposes of promoting and rewarding innovation (by granting some
form of monopoly rights in the invention) and facilitating public
access to inventions (by requiring disclosure and/or use). 8
IPR have been granted in some countries for hundreds of years,"
and their international status as a recognized form of property has
expanded exponentially in recent decades.' Information protected as
intellectual property, particularly under patent, has driven
remarkable recent progress in technology, medicine, and other fields
of applied science. Developed countries, whose citizens presently
stand to derive the greatest economic benefit from IPR and the
inventions they protect, have pushed for vigorous international
protection of IPR.2 ' However, developing countries generally support
greater access to intellectual property to address compelling human
needs and to facilitate socioeconomic development.n Consequently,
developing countries have viewed developed countries' drive for
vigorous IPR protection as unacceptable interference with their
proper roles as sovereigns addressing the needs of their citizens.'
Definition and regulation of property within a state's borders
15. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
16. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
17. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1114 (2000).
18. Gana, supra note 8, at 742.
19. Early patents were granted by the city-states of Renaissance Italy in the
fourteenth century. The Paris Convention, still in effect today, was originally
adopted by the major industrialized nations in 1883. Paris Convention, supra note 1.
20. Prior to the incorporation of TRIPS into GATT, many developing nations
declined to recognize IPR because their national policy concerns weighed more in
favor of free access to inventions. TRIPS induced many of these nations to begin
protecting IPR. Further, prior to TRIPS, many nations, both developed and
developing, declined to extend patent protection to certain kinds of inventions. In
particular, many nations, notably Canada, India, and Brazil, did not permit patents
on pharmaceuticals. TRIPS required WTO member nations to modify and expand
their intellectual property laws to encompass the full range of inventions protected
under TRIPS. Gana, supra note 8, at 746.
21. Nash, supra note 9, at 485.
22. Gana, supra note 8, at 736.
23. Nash, supra note 9, at 485.
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have traditionally been sovereign rights, subject to minimal external
scrutiny.'4 States regulate property within their boundaries in accord
with political and socioeconomic demands that are both distinct and
evolving-' Generally, property rights are protected to promote
investment and stability while property rights are derogated when
necessary to address public needs.26 A state's policy of protecting
property rights thus ebbs and flows according to a balancing of these
potentially conflicting purposes.'
Traditional respect for sovereign rights in property regulation
suggests that nations have the authority to regulate IPR according to
the changing needs of their citizens.8 IPR are therefore generally
regarded as national, limited to the jurisdiction of the country that
conferred them, with minimal extraterritorial effect.29 A state's
interpretation of the scope of IPR will therefore vary primarily in
accord with its own national welfare objectives, with international
ramifications considered secondarily."
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Board v. College Savings Bank
affirms the suggestion of state sovereignty with respect to IPR 1 In
that case, the Court held that, under the Eleventh Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, individual states were immune to liability for
infringement of patents granted under federal law.' Under Florida
Prepaid, individual states can infringe patents with no obligation to
compensate patent holders.3 Professor Menell has commented that
the state immunity recognized in Florida Prepaid may open the door
24. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 407 (1964) ("Every
sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory."). Courts will not examine a taking by a
foreign government of property located entirely within its own territory in the
absence of a contrary position in a treaty, even if the taking violates customary
international law because compensation is not prompt, adequate, and effective. Id.
25. Gana, supra note 8, at 747.
26. Lippert, supra note 5, at 255-56.
27. Id.
28. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 1, at 770.
29. Id. at 770-71.
30. Gana, supra note 8, at 747.
31. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Board v. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 636 (1999) ("Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant
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to similar sovereign immunity arguments in future negotiations for
protection of international IPR, weakening developed nations' ability
to persuade (or coerce) developing nations to adopt stronger
international IPR.'
However, IPR are distinguishable from traditional property
rights in that they have no locus,35 and because the value of IPR reside
almost exclusively in the protection against their unauthorized use?
Because IPR are intangible and subject to diminution through
unauthorized use, the traditional national approach to their
regulation may result both in ineffective protection of IPR and in a
weakening of the incentive to innovate that is a fundamental purpose
behind recognizing IPR.3 It has been suggested, therefore, that, in
order to create a free market in new technologies, IPR must be
accorded stronger, more uniform international protection than that
accorded to tangible property."
Further, stronger international protection of IPR is arguably
justified because IPR are granted to promote innovation, a purpose
beyond the traditional purpose of property rights (encouraging
investment and stability). Granting a limited monopoly in the form
of IPR is a substantial benefit to the right holder and a potential
detriment to the community. However, inducing innovation yields
long-term benefits to the community in the form of useful inventions,
justifying the right holder's limited monopoly.4
34. Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from
Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1399, 1460
(2000).
35. Brian F. Fitzgerald, Trade-Based Constitutionalisms: The Framework for
Universalizing Substantive International Law?, 5 Y.B. OF INT'L LAW 111, 146 (1996).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 147; see also Judy Rein, International Governance Through Trade
Agreements: Patent Protection for Essential Medicines, 21 J. INT'L L. Bus. 379, 380-81
(2001).
38. Fitzgerald, supra note 35, at 147 (suggesting that refusal to protect IPR
amounts to expropriation because unauthorized use of the information that
constitutes the basis of an IPR destroys its value).
39. Nash, supra note 9, at 502; Lippert, supra note 5, at 253.
40. lPR policy is based on an assumption that the benefit to the community is
balanced by the potential harm of the limited monopoly. Some commentators have
therefore suggested that inventors cannot reasonably be reviled for charging
monopoly prices during the term of a patent, because the patent is intended to grant
the inventor monopoly power. Evan Ackiron, The Human Genome Initiative and the
Impact of Genetic Testing and Screening Technologies: Note and Comment: Patents
for Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT Case, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 172 (1991).
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International regulation of IPR thus presents a general conflict
between developed countries seeking to expand IPR protection for
economic benefit and developing countries seeking to assert their
sovereign rights to acquire and apply new information to address
their citizens' pressing needs.4' The innovation promoted by IPR,
which ultimately benefits both developed and developing countries,
works as a moderating factor in this conflict.42
H. The Evolution of International Patent Law: Before and
After TRIPS
Prior to the latter years of the twentieth century, international
IPR were regulated under public law regimes.' In this context, initial
efforts at substantive harmonization of international IPR laws were
largely unsuccessful."8 The World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) conducted negotiations toward substantive harmonization
under the auspices of the United Nations. 5  However, WIPO
negotiations, whether viewed as favorable to developing or developed
nations, were routinely stymied.46  Conflicting policy concerns
resulted in polarized approaches to IPR regulation wherein
developed nations sought protection of their economic interests and
developing nations sought protection of their sovereign rights.47
Consequently, under the international public law regime, negotiations
addressing IPR as an isolated issue failed because neither developed
nor developing nations had incentive to compromise.4
In 1994, with the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round,
regulation of international IPR shifted from the public law regime to
the trade law regime . The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) incorporated significant
regulation of international IPR as a requirement for parties to
41. Gana, supra note 8, at 771-72.
42. Nash, supra note 9, at 502; Rein, supra note 37, at 381.
43. Gana, supra note 8, at 744.
44. Fitzgerald, supra note 35, at 137; Hicks & Holbein, supra note 1, at 782.
45. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 1, at 781.
46. Jean M. Dettmann, GATT. An Opportunity for an Intellectual Property
Rights Solution, 4 TRANSNAT'L L.J. 347, 356 (1991) (observing that, under the public
law regime, each nation has a vote, so that developing nations can form voting blocs
that give them leverage to counteract developed nations' power).
47. Fitzgerald, supra note 35, at 137.
48. Id. at 137-38.
49. TRIPS, supra note 2.
2001]
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GATT, and was a major first step toward substantive harmonization
of international IPR." Trade provided the incentive to compromise
that was missing under the public law regime." Countries that were
parties to GAT' 2 were required to comply with TRIPS in order to
receive the trade benefits available through GATT, namely most-
favored nation (MFN) status and national treatment.3  Further,
TRIPS raised the threat of cross-sector retaliation-the imposition of
trade sanctions against an economic sector unrelated to IPR.'4 This
cross-sector threat created an added pressure to compromise from
within third world nations; lobbying from domestic economic sectors
unrelated to the IPR debate, such as the textile industry, likely put
pressure on governments to enact TRIPS-compliant IPR regulations
in order to maintain MFN status and national treatment. 5 Thus,
linking IPR to trade provided tremendous, arguably coercive,
incentive to compromise. 6
International IPR, including patent rights, were markedly
strengthened under TRIPS 7  Member nations were required to
extend national treatment and MFN status, with respect to IPR, to
nationals of other member nations." Parties to GATT were required
50. Id.; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 279 (discussing the major
breakthroughs accomplished under TRIPS by coupling minimum standards of
protection for IPR to a binding system of dispute settlement and enforcement under
which the standards can be interpreted and implemented).
51. Fitzgerald, supra note 35, at 128.
52. There are 105 party nations of which 70 are developing nations. DETLEF F.
VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 66 (1998).
53. If a member nation is found to have violated TRIPS, the WTO has the
authority to impose unilateral sanctions under which the violating nation may forfeit
national treatment and most favored nation status. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 1, at
783.
54. Weissman, supra note 6, at 1095-96.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. VAGTS, supra note 52, at 364.
58. TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 3, 4. Article 3, "National Treatment," requires that
member nations "shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less
favorable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of
intellectual property." Id. art. 3. Article 4, "Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment,"
requires that, with regard to protection of intellectual property, advantages granted
by a member to the nationals of any other country shall be granted immediately and
unconditionally to the nationals of all other members. Id. art. 4. Further, because
TRIPS is annexed to GATT, violation of TRIPS can subject a member nation to
generalized trade sanctions encompassing trade issues outside the IPR realm.
[Vol. 25:87
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to extend a minimum standard of protection for IPR.59 With regard
to patents, some minimum protections were expressly defined.'
Patent protection was required for a minimum of twenty years.61
Patent protection was required for "any inventions... in all fields of
technology."62 Thus, countries that had previously declined on policy
grounds to allow patents on certain kinds of inventions (such as
pharmaceuticals) or that had no patent systems at all were required to
grant patents to the full range of inventions addressed under TRIPS.63
IPR enforcement procedures were required to be fair, equitable, and
not unnecessarily complicated or costly. 4  Further, the GATT
Uruguay Round included the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, which applied to
all disputes under GATT, including TRIPS.65 The understanding
enhanced the ability of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to
enforce GATT agreements, including TRIPS, in that it instituted
reverse consensus, that is, it required consensus to block the DSB
panel report and prevent resolution of the dispute. 6  Prior to
institution of reverse consensus, any member nation could block
resolution of a dispute with a single vote; under reverse consensus,
dispute resolution will proceed unless there is consensus among
member nations that the DSB panel report should be blocked.67
TRIPS included some concessions to address the concerns of
developing nations regarding policies of economic development and
the need to take protective measures.6 Developing and least
developed nations were not required to implement TRIPS
immediately. Developing nations received an additional four years
and least developed nations received up to ten years to comply.69
TRIPS deliberately did not address the issue of the doctrine of
59. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1.
60. Id. arts. 27-34.
61. Id. art. 33.
62. Id. art. 27.
63. Id.
64. Id. art. 41.
65. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note
2, Annex 1A, arts. 22, 23, 33 I.L.M. at 1182-83; Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Agreement, supra note 2,
Annex 2, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1226 [hereinafter DSU].
66. DSU, supra note 65, art. 16,33 I.L.M. at 1235.
67. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 1, at 790.
68. VAGTS, supra note 52, at 65.
69. TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 65-66.
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exhaustion; thus, parallel imports and gray market exports from
developing countries were not prohibited under TRIPS." Further,
TRIPS provided for compulsory licensing under certain conditions
and with reasonable compensation (discussed further in Section III).7
Despite these concessions, stronger IPR under TRIPS were
highly favorable to developed nations and were viewed by some as
coercive provisions that trampled upon developing nations'
sovereignty and legitimate concerns.' The TRIPS concessions to
developing countries have been characterized as "painfully
inadequate" to address the needs of those countries, even when
liberally interpreted.73 Interpretation of the substantive provisions is
in its earliest stages, however; few issues of substantive interpretation
of TRIPS and no cases involving interpretation of TRIPS compulsory
licensing provisions have been brought before the DSB to date.
Opportunities therefore exist to interpret TRIPS in a manner that is
respectful of both developed and developing nations' policy concerns,
ensuring the long-term viability of TRIPS and procuring for all
nations the benefits to be derived from innovation promoted by
IPR.7 One such opportunity presents itself in the interpretation of
"adequate remuneration" for compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical
patents under TRIPS.
111. Compulsory Licensing of Patents: Policy, Status and
Trends
A. Compulsory Licensing: Definition and Purpose
A compulsory license is an involuntary contract imposed upon a
patent holder by a government entity; the compulsory license grants
permission to the government entity or a third party to use the IPR to
further some political or social objective." Compulsory licenses are a
public right reserved by many nations as a safeguard against the
dangers inherent in the monopoly granted by a patent.76 Compulsory
70. Id. art. 6.
71. Id. art. 31.
72. Weissman, supra note 6, at 1075.
73. VAGTS, supra note 52, at 66.
74. Gana, supra note 8, at 771-72.
75. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECrUAL
PROPERTY 51-52 (1991).
76. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 1, at 813.
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licenses may be granted where a patent is acquired or used
improperly. Compulsory licenses may also be granted where a patent
holder refuses, typically on economic grounds, to use the patent to
make available to the public the product or process protected by the
patent.7 Under such a scenario, the public is denied access to the
protected product or process because the patent holder has refused to
make it available and has the right to prevent any other party from so
doing.8 If the patented product or process is required to address a
critical need, national and international laws have traditionally
provided for compulsory licensing to meet that need.79
B. International Agreements on Compulsory Licensing
1. International Agreements on Compulsory Licensing Prior to
TRIPS: Paris Convention Article 5
Prior to TRIPS, the most significant agreement relating to
protection of IPR was the Paris Convention."° Article 2(1) of the
Paris Convention required national treatment for IPR.8" However,
the Paris Convention did not prescribe minimum standards of
protection for IPR; therefore, a member nation was not required to
grant any form of IPR, provided the nation did not grant IPR to its
own citizens.' Compulsory licenses were thus consistent with the
philosophy of the Paris Convention and were expressly allowed under
Article 5(A)(2).' Some limits to compulsory licensing were implied
by Article 5(A)(2), which allowed compulsory licenses only "to
prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the
exclusive rights conferred by the patent."' 4 However, because the
Paris Convention provided no specific measures for enforcement of





80. Paris Convention, supra note 1.
81. Id. art. 2(1).
82. See id.
83. Id. art. 5(A)(2).
84. Id.
85. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 1, at 779.
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2. Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS Article 31
TRIPS does not expressly provide for compulsory licensing.'2
Article 31 of TRIPS, however, effectively provides for compulsory
licensing by allowing "other use of [patents] without the authorization
of the right holder."' The compulsory licensing provisions under
TRIPS have limitations, the most significant of which include: (1) the
compulsory license may be granted only after reasonable negotiations
have failed (this provision may be waived in case of national
emergency);'2 (2) the scope and duration must be limited to the
purpose for which the license was authorized and must cease if and
when conditions change to eliminate the purpose;89 (3) the license
must be exclusive and non-assignable; (4) the license shall be used
predominantly for the supply of the national market of the granting
nation;9 and (5) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration
under the circumstances of each case.'
The limiting provisions under Article 31 have been described by
developed countries as too liberal' and by developing countries as
too restrictive.94 No dispute as to the substantive interpretation of
Article 31 has been brought before the DSB.95 However, Article
31(a), which states that "authorization of such use [by compulsory
license] shall be considered on its individual merits," apparently
suggests that the DSB will have significant leeway in balancing the
respective interests of developing and developed nations when it
interprets Article 31. 6
C. National Compulsory Licensing Statutes: Status and Trends
Both developed and developing countries have statutes that
86. See TRIPS, supra note 2.
87. Id. art. 31.
88. Id. art. 31(b).
89. Id. art. 31(c), (g).
90. Id. art. 31(d), (e).
91. Id. art. 31(f).
92. Id. art. 31(h).
93. Lippert, supra note 5, at 246.
94. Weissman, supra note 6, at 1114 (noting that the Article 31 requirements for
adequate remuneration and manufacture predominantly for the domestic market are
prohibitively restrictive unless interpreted to favor developing countries' interests).
95. Sara M. Ford, Note, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS
Agreement. Balancing Pills and Patents, 12 AM U. INT'L L. Ruv. 941, 961 (2000).
96. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(a).
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permit compulsory licensing.' The statutes seek to make patented
products or processes available to meet the demands of national
markets" or to respond to national emergencies." The U.S.
government has authority to grant a compulsory license to a
government entity or contractor, provided that the license is for
public use and the right holder receives compensation."°  Other
governments in developed and developing nations have passed
similar public use statutes, both pre-dating and post-dating TRIPS.'0'
The United States has also passed a statute that effectively grants a
compulsory license with no compensation for private use of patented
medical procedures."n
Whether the various national compulsory licensing statutes are in
compliance with TRIPS is uncertain, as no compulsory licensing
statute has been brought before the DSB for review."3
Commentators have noted that some national compulsory licensing
statutes are facially non-compliant with TRIPS." Notwithstanding
uncertainty regarding compliance with TRIPS, however, statutes
providing for compulsory licensing to address pressing national needs
appear to be proliferating in both developed and developing
nations. 5  Consequently, the issue of proper substantive
interpretation of TRIPS provisions for compulsory licensing and
compensation is likely to come before the DSB soon."'
97. James Love, Compulsory Licensing: Models For State Practice in Developing
Countries, Access to Medicine and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accord (Jan.
21, 2001) (paper prepared for the United Nations Development Programme, version
1.0), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recommendedstatepractice.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2002); see also Robert Weissman, Symposium, INSIGHT MAG.,
Sept. 13, 1999, at 1 (noting that compulsory licensing is common practice around the
world including in the United States).
98. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 1, at 813.
99. Love, supra note 97.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994).
101. Love, supra note 97 (noting that Italy, Australia, Germany, Malaysia,
Singapore, New Zealand, the Philippines, Ireland, Switzerland, and Great Britain
currently have statutes permitting compulsory licensing for government use).
102. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (Supp. I11996).
103. Ford, supra note 95, at 961.
104. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete
Intersection at 35 U.S. C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 601, 669-70 (2000) (arguing
that § 287(c) is likely invalid under TRIPS).
105. See, e.g., William Dowell, Ethics and AIDS Drugs: Some Countries Want to
Suspend Patent and Trade Laws to Get Lower-Cost Medications to the Poor, TIME,
July 12, 1999, at 49.
106. Ford, supra note 95, at 944.
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IV. Proposed Compensation Standards for Compulsory
Licenses
Proposals for compensation to meet the Article 31(h)
requirement of "adequate remuneration" for compulsory licenses
have varied according to policy concerns. Developing countries seek
to promote access and competition through minimal compensation
strategies while developed countries seek to protect investment
through compensation for expectancy.
A. Developing Nations Seek Minimal Compensation
As a threshold matter, developing nations seek to define
"adequate remuneration" under Article 31(h) in accord with their
limited ability to pay." Developing countries are overwhelmingly
poor and unable to afford full market prices for patented products
such as pharmaceuticals.' Further, under TRIPS Article 31(a),
compulsory licenses can be implemented only where conditions
present a compelling need."9 Under such conditions a developing
nation's resources are likely to be already depleted through efforts to
address the issue; therefore, the nation would be unable to pay
compensation at the patent holder's full market price.' Thus, even
where a developing nation clears the Article 31(a) hurdle by
demonstrating a compelling need, compulsory licensing will be
unavailable to address that need unless Article 31(h) "adequate
remuneration" is interpreted to be limited in accord with the nation's
available resources."
1. Controlled Compulsory Licensing with Minimal Compensation
Will Promote, Not Stifle, Innovation
A primary purpose for granting monopoly rights under IPR is to
provide incentive to innovate. Developed countries have argued that
107. Weissman, supra note 6, at 1114.
108. Id. at 1111.
109. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(a).
110. Arguably, defining "adequate remuneration" according to the patent holder's
market price would render Article 31 meaningless. If "adequate remuneration"
meant "full market price," there would be little, if any, obstacle to the patent holder's
granting a license outside the context of a compulsory license. The inclusion of
Article 31(h) in TRIPS, therefore, implicitly suggests that "adequate remuneration"
is something less than market price and should be a function of the grantee's
valuation and ability to pay. Weissman, supra note 6, at 1114.
111. Id.
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compulsory licensing will weaken this incentive. Developing
countries, however, argue that limited compulsory licensing will not
stifle innovation, even where there is little or no compensation.
Indeed, most developed nations already provide for compulsory
licensing in certain critical areas."2 For example, in the United States,
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) prevents holders of patents in medical procedures
from suing doctors for infringement."' Section 287(c) effectively
grants a compulsory license with no compensation to the most likely
users of medical procedure patents-doctors. 4 Although the bill was
hotly contested and has been described by some commentators as
deleterious to innovation, its passage indicates that the U.S. Congress
balanced human need for access to medical procedures against the
potential damper on innovation and concluded that human need was
paramount."' Thus, developed nations' policies have reflected
recognition that innovation will not be unduly stifled by government
action that provides reasonable access to important inventions.
Developing nations further argue that compulsory licensing will,
in fact, increase innovation by facilitating industrial development."6
Rigid protection of patents may inhibit development of local
industry's capacity to perform innovative research that addresses
domestic issues that are often ignored as unprofitable to
multinational corporations. 7 Some persuasive counter-arguments in
favor of stronger patent protection conclude that the availability of
compulsory licensing impedes local research and development and
inhibits foreign direct investment that might jump-start local
industrial innovation." s However, empirical evidence indicates that
these conclusions are not unassailable."9 For example, elimination of
patents for pharmaceuticals in Brazil in 1969 was followed by a six-
fold increase in foreign investment in the local pharmaceuticals
industry.120
Unquestionably, the existing level of technological development
and innovation in developing nations is woefully inadequate to
112. Id.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
114. Ho, supra note 104, at 648-51.
115. Id.
116. Weissman, supra note 6, at 1120-21.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Lippert, supra note 5, at 259-60.
119. Weissman, supra note 6, at 1121-22.
120. Id.
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address those nations' needs. 2' However, the argument that
developing nations' innovative deficiencies are due to insufficient
protection of IPR is unconvincing in the face of developing nations'
need for viable science and technology infrastructure to support
education and research. Such infrastructure can only evolve after
developing nations achieve greater economic strength and stability.ln
3
It is notable that, although developed nations provide strong patent
protection today, in virtually all cases, that protection was not
extended until after the nation developed technological strength,
typically applying strategies based on imitation or copying.'2 ' By
analogy, greater access to IPR, including access to patents through
compulsory licensing, can play a vital role in the economic
development of developing nations." Such development will
enhance the level of global innovation, furthering an ultimate
objective of generating innovative capacities that will be applied to
both domestic and international needs.16
2. Compensation for Costs and Lost Profits Amounts to
Compensation Where There Was No Injury
Developing nations further argue that denial of compulsory
licenses absent full compensation for lost costs and sales is not
defensible because patent holders are not injured by temporary
licenses in developing nations. Case law in the United States supports
this proposition. 7 For example, in Leesona Corporation v. United
States, a federal court of appeals held that compensation should be
based on "what the [patent holder] has lost, not what the taker has
gained."'" Thus, the patent holders in Leesona were not entitled to
lost profits from sales at prevailing commercial market rates. 9




125. Gana, supra note 8, at 745-46.
126. This inherent tension between the need for access to IPR to enhance
economic development in developing nations and the need for greater protection of
IPR in developed nations indicates that TRIPS may be on shaky ground. As
discussed further in Section IV, substantive interpretation of TRIPS must address
both developed and developing nations' needs to ensure the long-term viability of
TRIPS. Id. at 775.




Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under TRIPS
Developing nations are not a real component of pharmaceutical
companies' markets."l Pharmaceutical manufacturers do not depend
on profits from developing countries."3 The companies do not
develop drugs for diseases endemic to developing countries.m The
companies may indeed sell drugs in developing countries, but these
drugs were developed for sale to citizens in developed countries. 33
Thus the pharmaceutical companies' investment is not directed at
developing countries, and their return on investment is not impacted
by compulsory licenses to address pressing health needs in those
countries. Under the reasoning of Leesona, therefore,
pharmaceutical patent holders are not entitled to compensation for
compulsory licenses that permit production and sale of drugs in
developing countries.
130. Rein, supra note 37, at 404 ("Diseases suffered by populations with no
purchasing power are not going to be addressed by commercial producers.").
131. Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, at 26 (noting that
no drug manufacturer depends on profits from Africa).
132. Pharmaceutical companies have previously made business decisions that
reflect exclusion of developing countries from their target markets. For example,
where sales in developed countries do not yield profits, pharmaceutical companies
have declined to produce selected pharmaceuticals critical to diseases ravaging
developing countries. One such drug is eflorithine. This drug is a cure for sleeping
sickness, which drives victims mad before causing coma and death. Sleeping sickness
infects approximately 300,000 people per year in central Africa, but does not impact
developed nations. Eflornithine is so effective that it can revive comatose patients in
late stages of the disease. However, eflornithine was developed as a cancer treatment
and, when found to be ineffective for that purpose, drug companies ceased its
manufacture. The supply of the drug available to treat sleeping sickness dwindled to
as few as 1,000 doses by February 2001. In a nearly ludicrous twist of fate, however,
sleeping sickness victims in Africa may be saved by the pursuit of beauty in the
developed world: eflornithine has recently been found effective in eliminating facial
hair in women. As a result of this profitable use, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and
Gillette Company have begun to manufacture the drug as a facial cream and are
negotiating with the World Health Organization to provide the drug in injectable
form. See Donald McNeil, Cosmetic Saves a Cure for Sleeping Sickness, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9,2001, at Al.
133. See, e.g., Rein, supra note 37, at 404-05 (noting that AIDS drugs were
developed for use in developed countries even though the vast majority of sufferers
live in developing countries).
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B. Developed Nations Seek Full Compensation for Lost Costs and
Profits
1. Full Compensation Is Necessary to Protect the Incentive to
Innovate, Which Is the Purpose of IPR Protection
Developed countries, particularly those with significant
pharmaceutical industries, argue that denial of full compensation for
compulsory licenses eviscerates the intellectual property policy of
promoting innovation."M Denial of full compensation for both lost
costs and profits will obstruct innovation because it will serve as a
disincentive to the investment that is so critical to research and
development." A study of pharmaceutical innovation compared to
price regulation of prescription drugs in developed countries
indicated that price controls apparently have a chilling effect on
pharmaceutical innovation.'36  The chairman of German
pharmaceutical giant Bayer suggested that "the research based
pharmaceutical industry no longer has much of a future [in
Germany]" if its innovation is dried up through price erosion."'
Compulsory licensing with compensation below fair market value
would likely have a similar deleterious effect on incentive to invest
and innovate."
The pharmaceutical industry is deeply dependent upon long-
term investment to support research and development 9  At the
laboratory research phase, 5,000 compounds are tested for every one
that is approved and marketed."4  The average new drug takes
fourteen years to bring to market, and the costs of getting to market
are staggering.4' On average, it costs $500 million to bring a new drug
to market, and only one out of every ten new approved drugs
134. Jerry Stanton, Comment, Lesson for the United States from Foreign Price
Controls on Pharmaceuticals, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 156 (2000).
135. Id. at 168 (noting that investment in the biotechnology sector dropped by
eleven percent in a single day following White House remarks favoring curtailment
of patents in the industry).
136. Id. at 171.
137. Stephen D. Moore, European State Funded Health Systems Come Under Fire
for Skyrocketing Costs, WALL ST. J., May 4,1993, at A14.
138. Id.
139. Stanton, supra note 134, at 156.
140. Id. at 155-56.
141. Id. at 155.
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recovers its costs. 142 Thus, annual accounting sheets reflecting huge
profits, viewed by some as unconscionable, fail to account for the
tremendous costs incurred over more than a decade of research and
development.143
Developed nations with pharmaceutical industries thus recognize
the need to promote investment and innovation and support fair
market value compensation for compulsory licensing. For example,
in the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 allows compulsory licensing for
public use but requires compensation, as for a taking." The standard
for compensation of a taking is "just compensation," such that "[t]he
owner is ... put in the same position monetarily as he would have
occupied if his property had not been taken.' '145 The standard has
been further clarified as requiring compensation at full market
value."4 Switzerland permits compulsory licensing of patents, but
treats the licenses as expropriation.' 47 The international standard for
compensation for expropriation is that it be "paid without delay and
be fully realizable."''M  Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, "adequate" compensation for expropriation is defined as
fair market value, including going concern value and asset value
before the expropriation took place.149 Developed nations thus urge
that "adequate remuneration" for compulsory licensing under TRIPS
be interpreted as fair market value of the license, incorporating the
costs of both development and lost profits.
2. Full Compensation Is Necessary to Compensate Patent Holders
for Lost Revenues Due to Resale of Gray Market Goods
Produced Under Compulsory License
The doctrine of exhaustion enables resale of gray market
goods.5 Under the doctrine of exhaustion, once a patented product
is sold with the patent holder's consent, the patent holder has no right
142. Id.
143. Id. at 156.
144. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 968-69 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
145. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14,16 (1970).
146. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, 441 U.S. 506, 510-17
(1979).
147. Love, supra note 97.
148. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, art. 1110(3),
107 Stat. 2057.
149. Id. art. 1110(2).
150. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 1, at 810-12.
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to control subsequent resale of the product, either nationally or
internationally, absent some protective statute."' Thus, a patented
product may be purchased abroad and imported for sale at a price
below national market price, unless a national statute prevents
unauthorized import of patented products.'
The major pharmaceutical companies, concentrated in a handful
of developed nations, rely on significant revenues from sales in
foreign markets; U.S. pharmaceutical companies estimate that foreign
sales account for forty percent of annual revenues."' However,
revenues from foreign sales are significantly depleted, by as much as
$5 billion annually, by parallel import of gray market goods."54 Thus,
the gray market significantly impacts pharmaceutical companies'
gross revenues and, consequently, reduces resources that might be
reinvested in future research and development.' In 1996, the
International Trade Commission estimated that revenues lost to gray
market sales of pharmaceuticals result in foregone reinvestment
totaling almost $1 billion per year.5 6 Assuming an approximate cost
of $500 million to bring a new drug to market, annual losses to the
gray market each year represent lost opportunity to bring two new
drugs to bear against human diseases. 7
However, TRIPS expressly avoids addressing international
regulation of gray market goods and parallel imports.'58 TRIPS art. 6
provides that "nothing in this agreement shall be used to address the
issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."'59 TRIPS
further states that "there shall be no obligation to apply [border
enforcement] to imports of goods put on the market in another
country by, or with, consent of the [patent holder]."' The United
States prohibits import of patented goods without the patent holder's
151. Id.
152 Id.
153. George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent
Protection: The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and Its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 283, 297-98 (1998).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Gerald J. Mossinghof & Thomas Bombelles, The Importance of Intellectual
Property Protection to the American Research-Intensive Pharmaceutical Industry,
COLuM. J. WORLD Bus., Spring 1996, at 39.
157. Stanton, supra note 134, at 156.
158. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 6.
159. Id.
160. Id. art. 51 n.13.
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authorization. '61 However, many industrialized nations have no such
protective statutes, and TRIPS does not mandate their adoption.
62
Thus, at this time, TRIPS in no way limits parallel import or resale of
gray market goods.
Further, under TRIPS Article 31, goods manufactured under a
compulsory license can be exported from the country granting the
compulsory license.63 Consequently, TRIPS does not proscribe use of
compulsory licenses to exploit a patent holder's international markets
through sale of gray market goods1 6 Because TRIPS provides no
mechanism to prevent losses due to parallel imports, and because
compulsory licensing under TRIPS is not restricted to production for
domestic use, developed nations argue that compensation for
compulsory licenses should include compensation for pharmaceutical
companies' losses due to sale of products made under compulsory
license but sold on the gray market.65
V. Recommendations
Any compulsory licensing compensation solution that does not
address the valid interests of both developed and developing nations
will exacerbate the tension underlying TRIPS and weaken the
binding force of the agreement." The linkage of TRIPS to the
benefits of world trade under GATT presents a powerful tool for
enforcement of IPR rights.' 67 Applied without sensitivity, the force
behind TRIPS may create irreconcilable differences that destabilize
rather than promote world trade" and discourage rather than
161. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
162. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 6.
163. "[Goods manufactured under compulsory license] shall be authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the member authorizing [the
compulsory license]." Id. art. 31(f) (emphasis added).
164. Id.
165. Alternatively, as discussed below in Section V.B., losses due to gray market
sale of goods made under a compulsory license could be prevented by amending
TRIPS to disallow such sale. Frederick M. Abbott, First Round (Final) to the
Committee on International Trade Law of the International Law Association on the
Subject of Parallel Importation, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 607, 635-36 (1998).
166. Fitzgerald, supra note 35, at 153.
167. Gana, supra note 8, at 775.
168. Abbott, supra note 12, at 85 (arguing that intense efforts by the U.S.
government and the pharmaceutical industry threaten to undermine the political
foundations of the WTO).
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enhance innovation. 69 However, opportunities exist in future GATT
negotiations to promote the worldwide interest in innovation while
balancing developing and developed countries' disparate interests.
A. Address Compelling Needs of Developing Nations: Compulsory
Licenses with No Compensation
Where a country is still developing its capacity to meet its
citizens' fundamental human needs, strong protection of IPR will
likely be infeasible, an unaffordable luxury.70 WTO threats of trade
sanctions and other external pressure to comply with TRIPS
ultimately will be ineffective in the face of developing countries'
urgent domestic needs. 7' Thus, to ensure the long-term viability of
TRIPS, its terms must be interpreted with attention to the compelling
human needs in developing countries.'
Because developing countries cannot pay the monopoly prices
that pharmaceutical companies may charge for their patented
inventions, these countries are not a part of pharmaceutical
companies' market. Further, because these countries do not yet have
the internal capacity to generate critical pharmaceuticals, it is not
feasible for them to produce them independently. However,
compelling human needs in developing countries will likely drive
them to invoke Article 31 compulsory licensing in order to gain access
to critical pharmaceuticals. Commensurate with the standard of
compensation for a taking of an IPR under U.S. law,74 adequate
remuneration for such a compulsory license should reflect "what the
[patent holder] has lost, not what the taker has gained."' 75 Therefore,
where a compulsory license of a patent for a critical pharmaceutical is
granted for public use in a developing country toward which a
pharmaceutical company has targeted no investment or expectation,
the patent holder has suffered no loss and is not entitled to
compensation.'76  In these limited circumstances, "adequate
169. Id.
170. Id. at 771-72.
171. Id.
172- Id.
173. Rein, supra note 37, at 400-04; see also John Donnelly, Brazil Moves to Break
Patent on AIDS Drug, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 23, 2001, at A8.
174. See discussion supra, Section IV.A.2.
175. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
176. This conclusion is consistent with the U.S. position adopted with respect to
medical procedure patents which, based on imperative need, are effectively subject to
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remuneration" in TRIPS Article 31(h) should be interpreted to mean
"without compensation."
B. Protect and Promote Developed Countries' Legitimate
Economic Interests: Eliminate Parallel Import of Patented
Pharmaceuticals Manufactured Under Compulsory License
Development of pharmaceutical products requires immense
investment of resources. It is undisputed that a new drug costs
millions of dollars to develop and that very few drugs are ultimately
successful enough to recover that cost. The timeframe for
development of new drugs is also significant. Investors and inventors
must both wait years, or even decades, before they receive a return,
or realize a loss, on their investment. However, the market for a
successful patented pharmaceutical is usually vast. The profits from
exclusive sales of a single drug can provide rich returns and the
industry attracts some of the world's brightest minds and deepest
pockets.
These conditions in the pharmaceutical industry provide a most
compelling example of the benefit of IPR, particularly patents.
Absent the limited monopoly granted under a patent, it is unlikely
that the millions of dollars and years of research would be available
for the development of new drugs. The entitlement to charge
monopoly prices for the duration of a patent is therefore reasonable,
and in fact is the primary intended benefit to a patent holder. The
intended benefit to the community is also achieved by strong
protection of IPR: the community benefits from increased innovation
and has access to life-improving and life-saving drugs that would not
otherwise exist.
It is also undisputed that human need for pharmaceuticals in
developing countries is compelling and that those countries do not
have the resources to pay monopoly prices. In certain critical
circumstances, compulsory licensing by the governments of these
countries is likely warranted. However, the provisions in TRIPS
Article 31(f), which arguably allow production under compulsory
license for export of the patented product, coupled with TRIPS
Article 6, which expressly declines to limit parallel import of gray
market goods, present an unwarranted and unacceptable threat to the
reasonable interests of the patent holders. Export of gray market
compulsory license without compensation under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). Ho, supra note
104, at 648-51.
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pharmaceuticals produced under compulsory license for sale in
developed countries would directly and adversely affect sales in the
patent holder's legitimate target market. This result is too costly on
the patent holder's exclusive rights because it is not directly linked to
alleviation of critical health needs in the licensing country." Thus,
future substantive interpretation and amendment of TRIPS should
clarify that production for export and gray market sale are not
permitted under an Article 31 compulsory license.'78
C. Conclusion
In compulsory licensing matters, TRIPS should be interpreted in
a manner that respects the legitimate policy concerns of both
developed and developing nations.'79 When a compulsory license of a
patent for a critical pharmaceutical is granted for public use in a
developing country, where a pharmaceutical company has targeted no
investment and has no expectation of profits, "adequate
remuneration" in TRIPS Article 31(h) should be interpreted to mean
"without compensation." At the same time, TRIPS Article 31(f)
should be interpreted as not allowing production under compulsory
license for export and gray market sale of the patented product. Such
interpretations of TRIPS' provisions provide one possible means of
resolving the general conflict between developed countries who seek
stronger IPR protection for economic benefit, and developing
countries who seek to acquire and apply new technology to address
their citizens' pressing needs.
177. Less developed countries do not have the infrastructure necessary to produce
pharmaceuticals. A compulsory license granted under these circumstances must
therefore be accompanied by the right to import the drug from a country that does
have infrastructure to manufacture the drug. However, this reasoning does not apply
to permit import to countries other than the country granting the compulsory license
or to re-export from the country granting the compulsory license.
178. Abbott, supra note 165, at 635-36 (advocating an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion for goods produced under compulsory license, based on harm to the IPR
objective of inducing innovation).
179. Gana, supra note 8, at 771-72.
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